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Abstract 
The paper contributes to the debate on the political economy of implementation of pro-
poor social policy. It argues for a broadening of the debate, which is dominated by 
technocratic arguments, emphasizing the lack of financial resources, technology or skills as 
the major barriers for effective implementation. Describing the dynamic interplay of ‘formal’ 
operational programme structures and ‘informal’ traditional institutions in delivering the CT-
OVC – the largest and oldest cash transfer programme in Kenya – it argues for the need to 
look more closely into the local political economy as an important mediating arena for 
implementing social policies. Implementation is heavily contingent upon the local social, 
political and institutional context that influences and shapes its outcomes. These processes 
are highly dynamic and ambivalent evolving between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ structures and 
institutions. They may change over time and place, challenging the implicit assumption that 
programmes are evenly implemented across geographic and political entities.  
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Introduction  
The idea that context and politics matter for the implementation of development interventions is 
nothing new. Over the last decade, a substantial set of literature has tried to show how different 
stakeholders, types of political regimes and overall socio-economic conditions shape social policy 
reform processes and outcomes in developing countries, often with an explicit policy goal (for 
example, Hickey 2007, Hickey 2009, Lavers and Hickey 2015, Bender 2013, Künzler 2016).  
Most of the literature on the politics of social protection is however mainly concerned with what 
policy cycle models define the policy-formulation stage1. To what extent the local political context 
and institutional settings influence day-to-day implementation processes of pro-poor social 
protection interventions remains a relatively under-researched area and confined to often very 
specific operational features, such as targeting (for example, Pellisery 2005, Raabe et al. 2010, 
Shankar et al. 2011, Barrientos and Pellisery 2014, Wanyama and McCord 2017). While much 
empirical evidence of implementation challenges of pro-poor social policy intervention at local 
level exists (for Kenya see for example Calder et al. 2011), the debate about it is mainly reduced 
to technical shortcomings, such as imperfect data or lack of human capacity. Institutional or 
political aspects remain rather marginalized. If mentioned they are commonly framed as a barrier 
to smooth programme implementation providing an obstacle to effective and efficient delivery to 
the poor which in turn can only be overcome by investing in implementation structures still 
considered imperfect (Ibid, Cosgrove et al. 2011). 
This article on the politics of implementation in the context of the Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) in Kenya takes a different approach. Discussing the role of 
traditional authorities in implementing Kenya’s largest and oldest cash transfer programme, the 
article questions the general assumption that - once an operational structure has been designed 
and guidelines for its implementation developed – pro-poor social policies are implemented 
accordingly and what is more, evenly across different geographic and political entities. Instead, we 
will show that a re-interpretation and adaption of operations and institutions delivering them is 
taking place. Describing how formalized implementation processes and institutions of the Kenyan 
CT-OVC become enmeshed and adapted into the local political economy in three counties in 
Kenya the article argues for the need to look more closely into local political economics as an 
important mediating arena for implementing social policies. While technical constraints such as 
                                              
1 Different models of policy cycle models exist that define varying numbers of policy stages (see for example 
Howlett et al. 2009 or Grindle and Thomas 1991.  
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limited human and financial capacity play a role, implementation is heavily contingent upon the 
local social and political context that influence and shape its outcomes. Rather than giving a static 
assessment of these institutional factors as either functional or dysfunctional in delivering effective 
social assistance programmes for the very poor, the article argues for an understanding of 
institutionalization processes as an interplay that evolves between ‘formal’ programme structures 
and ‘informal’ power structures and institutions2. This interplay is a highly dynamic and for that 
matter, ambivalent process that evolves over time. While programmes appear to settle into these 
local power-relations schemes, the institutionalization of the programme over time however 
appears to create a new institutional equilibrium in which ‘formal’ rules and regulations are 
getting engrained and differentiate themselves out as separate autonomous structures.    
In doing so, the article aims at contributing to the largely missing debate on the political economy 
of implementation of pro-poor social policy. It argues for a broadening of the debate, which so 
far has been dominated by mainly technocratic arguments, emphasizing the lack of financial 
resources, technology or skills as the major barriers for effective implementation and overcoming 
institutional challenges and at the same time, identifying these dimensions as the major solutions 
to these problems.  
Secondly, presenting empirical evidence on the role of traditional authorities in implementing the 
cash transfer, the article questions the widespread notion and approach in policy and research 
that tends to define so-called ‘informal’ or traditional institutional settings in strong antagonism 
to their formal counterpartsi. Using an empirically grounded inductive approach that understands 
institutional change as a dynamic interplay of different sets of institutions, the article argues for a 
relational approach that understands ‘informal’ institutions as an integral part of the local social, 
political and administrative institutional set-up and on a level playing field with ‘formal’ 
institutions. Institutional arrangements may thus also comprise of a mixture of different types of 
institutions or hybrid forms of institutional equilibria. In doing so, it follows an historical 
comparative institutional analysis that understands institutions as “(…) constraints (italics in 
original) that influence social interactions and provide incentives to maintain regularities of 
behavior” (Greif 1998:80). Based on the game-theoretical principle of ‘equilibrium’, these 
constraints and rules are understood as being endogenous, i.e. outcomes of interactions between 
social forces and evolutionary historical processes rather than exogenously given and enforced 
from outside. Institutional change is thus understood as a reflection of the interaction of society’s 
                                              
2 The terms will be extensively discussed in the next section.  
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decision makers, their past institutions and the evolving environment in which they interact (Ibid.). 
A core idea of this approach is to identify the relevant rules of the game that determine actual 
behavior and constrain social forces rather than looking at the technically feasible rules (see also 
Hyden 2008). Such a functional approach (Benda-Beckmann 1994) also allows identifying 
informal institutions as having an important positive catalyst role with regard to the 
implementation of pro-poor policies. Local power structures and distributional mechanisms might 
differ from formal programme rules and regulations and underlie a different logic, but this does 
not necessarily always need to have negative consequences for the poor. This may also require a 
re-thinking and re-interpretation of “efficiency” and “effectiveness” in a new context.   
Thirdly, debating implementation challenges at local level in Kenya, the article also contributes to 
the debate of institutional change in weak administrative settings (see for example Casson et al. 
2010). Especially in developing countries where administrative institutional structures are weak, 
the delivery of social policies targeted at individual or households represents a huge challenge to 
local delivery structures. Local social, administrative and political structures, such as traditional 
authorities gain importance as important delivery structures that due to their knowledge and 
influence mediate policy outcomes in various ways. With reference to the resurging debates of 
traditional authorities as development brokers (for example, Baldwin 2013) and the debate about 
hybrid democracies in Africa (Logan 2009), the article aims at contributing to the current policy 
debate on how to react to implementation challenges in weak administrative contexts. Rather 
than engaging in a debate of informal institutions crowding out formalised practices thereby 
fostering existing power relations versus informal institutions being a necessary facilitator of 
institutional change towards formalized institutions, the article argues for a more dynamic and 
political perspective that will also need to come to grips with hybrid implementation structures. 
This article proceeds as follows: the first section reviews the theoretical debates of institutional 
change focusing in particular on the dynamic interplay between formal and informal institutions 
and delivery mechanisms. Before turning to the empirical debate, the second part of the article 
gives a short overview of the institutional setting of Kenya, in particular the local level and the 
operational structure of the Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, 
which is a centrally managed. In the final two sections, empirical results are discussed in the light 
of the theoretical assumptions and conclusions drawn. 
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The rules of the game: Addressing the interplay between formal and 
informal institutions 
Anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists and economists have argued since long for the 
need to look closer into so-called ‘informal’ institutions3 in order to get a better understanding of 
policy processes and their outcomes, in particular with regard to mediating access to resources 
(for example, Scott 1976, Zacher 1988, Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988; Hyden 2008, Powell and Di 
Maggio 1991, Putman 1993, O’Donnell 1996, Easter 2000, Helmke and Levitsky 2006, Voigt 
2009, Carey et al. 2017). Such “informal institutionalized practices” (Carrey et al. 2017:4) also 
exist in highly institutionalized democracies and administrations, as shown by Lijphard (2012) in 
his famous account on the Dutch political system. They are however of particular relevance in 
developing countries where formal institutional and administrative settings tend to be weak and 
where so-called ‘informal’ institutions closely interact with ‘formal’ ones, often playing a key role 
in enabling or constraining political behavior and shaping institutional outcomes (for example 
Stone et al. 1996; Hyden 2008, Helmke and Levitsky 2006).  
According to Voigt (2009) institutions are commonly characterised by two closely interrelated 
components, a) collectively shared rules and b) functioning sanctioning mechanisms. Based on 
these considerations institution are thus, defined as “commonly known rules that structure 
recurring patterns of interaction and are equipped with enforcement mechanisms that allow for 
sanctioning or threat of sanctioning in case of non-compliance.” (Voigt 2009:27, own 
translation).  
It is thus, not relevant whether institutions emanate from within a formal or informal context, the 
latter being characterised by rules and regulations that are usually not codified or unwritten. 
Moreover, it does not imply that informal institutions are necessarily everything that is non-formal 
being often defined in a rather derogatory way as patterned behaviour “comprised of norms, 
values and other elements of “culture”” (Carey et al. 2017; see also Helmke and Levitsky 2004). 
Rather, this approach puts both formal and informal institutions at a level-playing field 
emphasizing their functional dimension in shaping policy outcomes and institutional change and 
for that matter, the distribution of resources (see also Benda-Beckmann 1994). It shifts the gaze 
from an antagonistic and functionalist view that draws a clear line between formal and informal 
institutions as two completely different and separate sets of institutions towards a relational 
                                              
3 Institutional economics often define them as well as “internal” institutions as opposed to “external” or formal 
ones (see for example Kiwit and Voigt 1995).   
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approach that focuses on the interplay of both in reproducing institutional change and policy 
outcomes, emphasizing their permeability (Benda-Beckmann 1988). 
We argue that such broader view on institutional development and change enables to develop 
explanatory models that rather than focusing on actual or desired outcomes of institutional 
change centre on the process and dynamics of how institutional change is actually happening 
emphasizing agency as a key variable in reproducing institutions and change. This, we will argue 
may also have practical implications on how to deal with institutional change.   
Secondly, such an approach does away with what is commonly called the “institutional myths” of 
formal rationalized government structures being the only ones producing efficient and effective 
behaviour and being more ‘ruly’ than informal institutions (Carey et al. 2017). While the 
importance of informal institutions in shaping formal institutional outcome and change is 
meanwhile recognized across all disciplines, the primacy of ‘formal’ rational structures over 
informal practices remains strong in research and policy.  
While law clearly recognizes the importance of societal rules and regulations for the development 
of formalized law embodied in written codes and paragraphs, the primacy of formal codified law 
and respective sanctioning mechanisms over informal one is pervasive in much of the literature. 
This notion of the ‘rule of law’ as opposed to ‘unruly practices’ (O’Donnell 1996) has also 
dominated the neo-institutionalist strand of political science, in particular in the aftermath of 
1989 and the breakdown of the post-soviet authoritarian regimes (see for example, Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004). It also resonates in the debate of good governance that argues that only the 
development of formalised rules and regulations would guarantee functioning institutions and 
thus development and growth (for a critical review, for example Grindle 2004; Chowdhury and 
Jomo 2012) 
What is more, this conceptual approach also breaks with the implicit notion in much of the 
development literature and policy analysis of ‘informal’ institutions having a largely negative 
impact on the outcome of policy processes and resource distribution - usually in favour of the 
already powerful and rich. As Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argue, institutional thrift does not 
automatically go into the direction of ‘formalization’, thus giving way to the narrative “(…) in 
which informal institutional practices constrain behavior, reinforcing path dependency.” (Carey et 
al. 2017:4). Instead, ‘informal’ institutions and practices also have an important role in 
“correcting” the limitations of ‘formal’ ones (Stinchcombe 2001). Rather than ascribing a-priori 
certain characteristics to one or the other, such as legality, efficiency or effectiveness, we would 
like to emphasize the need to an empirically based approach that looks into how different actors 
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and institutions shape institutional mechanisms and distributional outcomes - no matter whether 
they have their origins in a ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ setting.  
Many disciplines have meanwhile recognized the importance of agency in shaping the ‘rules of 
the game’ (Hyden 2008; Webster and Engberg-Pedersen 2002; Lavers and Hickey 2015). Rather 
than talking about ‘unruly practices’ there is much debate about hybrid democracies, in particular 
in the African context (Logan 2009). The sociological debate about informal institutions playing an 
important role in brokering development appears to experience a revival (Long 1990; Baldwin 
2013). However, these processes and in particular the dynamics that develop between ‘formal’ 
and ‘informal’ institutions remain largely undefined or limited to specific case studies or specific 
phenomena, such as neo-patrimonial politics of clientilism or corruption (for example, Lawson 
2009).  
We argue for the need to capture the dynamics of interaction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
institutions in a more systematic and structured way in order to better understand and assess 
certain dynamics and in order to allow for a more comparative perspective across different regions 
and countries, as well as social policy interventions. Various typologies of different types of 
interaction that follow a more nuanced understanding exist (for example Kiwitt and Voigt 1994; 
for a summary see Voigt 2009). Here we will borrow from Helmke and Levitsky (2004), who in 
their debate on the critical role of informal institutions in shaping political behaviour and outcome 
argue for a more differentiated set of interactions between formal and informal institutions. 
Trying to overcome the simple antagonism of ‘formal’ institutions being characterised as 
functional or problem solving versus ‘informal’ institutions being dysfunctional or problem 
creating, they adopt a relational approach that describes the way in which informal and formal 
institutions interact (Ibid, Voigt 2009).  
Their typology identifies four ideal types of formal-informal interaction. The latter are not static 
but describe fluid processes often taking place simultaneously within the same institution. 
Moreover, they turn our attention to the fact that although the predominance of ‘informal’ 
institutions may be a consequence of weak ‘formal’ institutions, this may not be necessarily the 
case. Also, the opposite may be true: even where formal institutions are strong, informal 
institutions may exist and be highly influential.   
They start out from the assumption that policy outcomes may either be convergent, i.e. they 
match initial policy objectives, or divergent, i.e. meaning that they might substantially differ from 
intended policy objectives. Based on this notion, the concept defines four ideal types of outcomes 
that characterize the interplay between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: A typology of informal institutions 
Outcomes Effective Formal Institutions Ineffective Formal Institutions 
Convergent Complementary Substitutive 
Divergent Accommodating Competing 
Source: Helmke and Levitsky (2004) 
In a convergent setting, meaning that policy outcomes are achieved according to their initial 
objectives, intended informal institutions may assume a complementary function, supporting 
formal institutions in place and functioning as gap filler. They do not merely exist alongside 
effective formal institutions, but “(…) play a key role in making effective the formal rules of the 
game” (Ibid: 728). Examples would be informal social networks of civil servants that help to create 
solutions for better coordination. In an environment where formal institutions are weak or not 
enforced, informal institutions may assume a substitutive function, taking over successfully tasks, 
which formal institutions were designed for, but which they failed to achieve.  
Conversely, in a diverging context, the interaction between formal and informal institutions may 
on the one hand take an accommodating turn. Despite effective formal institutions existing, 
“informal institutions create incentive to behave in ways that alter the substantive effects of 
formal rules, without directly violating them.” (Ibid: 729). The practice of rewarding loyal partisans 
with high-level civil service jobs by influencing official selection processes is a typical example. On 
the other hand, where formal structures are weak, informal institutions may structure incentives 
in ways that are incompatible with the formal rules. In this situation, multiple systems of legal 
obligations are created that exist in parallel and are competing with each other: in order to follow 
one rule, actors must violate one another. Most common examples are clientilism, patronage, clan 
politics or corruption (ibid.)  
This also implies a shift in the notion of what we consider efficient and effective in order to 
measure the quality of institutional outcomes. As we will see, for agents in charge of the delivery 
of cash transfers it can be much more efficient and effective to rely on ‘informal’ institutions and 
diverge from ‘formal’ rules and regulations in order to achieve intended programme outcomes.   
 
Methodology and dataii 
The paper is the result of a qualitative research focusing on the political economy of cash transfers 
in three Kenyan counties. The selection criteria for the research sites were 1) differences in poverty 
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incidences and 2) differences in per capita income (relatively high, medium and relatively low) and 
3) differences in geographic setting, i.e. rural-urban. In Nairobi, research was conducted in Kibera, 
considered one of the biggest urban slums in Kenya. Nairobi has an average poverty rate of 21.8 
percent and a poverty gap of 4 percent. Although no evidence exists, these data need to be 
considered considerably higher for Kibera. West-Pokot is a scarcely populated rural area in the 
North of Kenya and one of the most marginalised areas in terms of access to social services. The 
poverty rate is high at 66.3 percent with a poverty gap of 16 percent. Despite high poverty rates, 
income inequality is relatively low. West-Pokot and Nairobi rank among the five most equal 
counties in this respect. Kwale on the contrary is one of the counties with the highest rate of 
inequality both with regard to income and mean expendituresiii. Poverty rates are severe at 70.7 
percent with a poverty gap of 42 percent (KNBIS and SID 2013). With regard to income levels no 
data are available. Instead, consumption expenditure patterns were used as a proxy to identify the 
sample: They show that  Nairobi is one of the wealthiest counties in Kenya with only 9.8 percent 
of the population in the lowest quintile having a monthly consumption expenditure of less than 
Ksh. 1,440, 13.6 percent of the population are in the second quintile spending less than Ksh. 
2,840 per month, in West-Pokot these numbers are significantly higher lying at 33 percent and 24 
percent respectively. In Kwale county, expenditure patterns are even more pronounced: 56.1 
percent of the population are in the first quintile while 9.9 percent are in the second. This also 
confirms the huge gap in income and expenditure between rural and urban areas (Ibid.).  
Twenty-two interviews were conducted with local stakeholders engaged in the implementation of 
the CT-OVC. They included interviews with civil servants at county and sub-county level 
responsible for the implementation of the cash transfer programme, representatives of the local 
authorities, as well as representatives of local CT-OVC institutions created to facilitate the 
implementation of the programme. In addition, five interviews with representatives of agencies 
responsible for the implementation of the CT-OVC at national level were conducted, including 
two interviews with representatives of Kenyan research institutions and considered experts in the 
field as independent observers. Interview partners were purposefully selected following a review 
of policy documents and secondary data including peer-reviewed papers, other published and 
unpublished materials, the internet and other grey literature as well as through a stakeholder 
mapping.  
The interviews mainly took place at the offices of the participants, mostly during working hours. 
In order to ensure consistency and comparability of information collected, semi-structured 
interview guidelines were developed for each stakeholder group. Questions centred around 
operational features of the CT-OVC and related implementation challenges, including roles and 
9 
 
responsibilities, issues of coordination and cooperation among various stakeholders involved in 
the delivery of the programme and across sectors, as well as ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions. 
Interviews were recorded (where consent was given) and detailed notes taken for those 
individuals who did not consent to recording. All interviews were transcribed into Microsoft Word 
and analysed using Atlas.ti.  
A second data source were legal (laws, regulations, decrees) and policy documents, including 
strategies, reports and evaluations and academic literature on Kenya and social protection, 
including books and articles.  
For analysing the interviews and other text-material, we used a hermeneutic-interpretative 
approach. Trying to extrapolate the specificities of the local political economy and describe the 
processes as to how pro-poor programmes are being adapted and modified to fit the local 
context and institutional set-up, the analysis is based on historical comparative institutional 
analysis (Morgan et al. 2010). This implies an inductive analytical approach based on very context 
specific evidence and micro-theoretical models (Greif 1998).   
 
Country background  
Kenya is one of the biggest economies in Africa. However, over the last years internal and external 
shocks have rendered growth rates highly volatile.4 Growth has reached an all-time high at 8.4 
percent in 2010, but has since then oscillated between 5 percent and 6 percent.5 While 
exogenous factors have played a role in this, main contributors are endogenous factors, such as 
political uncertainty and increasingly frequent incidences of drought. The verdict of the high court 
to nullify elections of 8 August 2017 to run for re-election on 17 October 2017 and the 
devastating drought that is taking place in the North since the beginning of 2018 vividly confirm 
this fact. A gap in physical infrastructure (transport, water and energy) and ineffective 
governance, in particular the high incidence of corruption are considered the key bottleneck for 
the development of Kenya’s economy and society.6 
                                              
4 These include in particular the post-election crisis, drought, the global financial and economic crisis, high 
international oil and food prices, and slowdown in global economic activity (Deloitte 2016). 
5 World Development Indicators: [29.05.2017]   
6 Footnote 5.  
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The majority of Kenyans live in the rural areas (almost 75 percent). This explains why agriculture 
continues to be the mainstay of Kenya’s economy. Seven out of ten Kenyans living in rural areas 
are working in agriculture. While the share of working age population already reached 56 percent 
in 2014, this number will continue to rise rapidly over the next decade. The majority of the 
productive population will find an outcome in the informal sector economy, which already now 
employs almost 90 percent of the working population.7  
Despite good economic performance, poverty in Kenya has substantially increased since the 
1990s, from 21.5 percent in 1997 to 47 percent in 2005. Current estimates assume a decline to 
42 percent in 2012.8 Major reasons for overall increase in poverty are uneven and poor 
agricultural development paired with rising food and fuel prizes since 2009. Poverty in Kenya is 
markedly higher in rural (50 percent) than urban areas (34 percent). Ninety percent of Kenyans in 
the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution live in rural areas.9 Poverty also varies across 
regions from a high of 74 percent in the North Eastern province to a low of 22 percent in Nairobi. 
 
Local political and institutional structures  
After 22 years of one-party-rule, Kenya transitioned to multi-party in 1991 and since then, has 
experienced five democratic elections and adopted a new constitution in 2010. After the intense 
political violence in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 elections, which has brought the country 
almost at the brink of civil war, the new constitution was to represent a break with the pastiv. The 
introduction of substantial checks- and balances aimed at significantly curtailing the powers of the 
executive branchv and the devolution of the government system were meant to put an end to the 
intense centralization of power that the Kenyan political system had witnessed over the years and 
which even the introduction of multi-party could not reverse (Hassan 2015).  
Compared to other African countries, the degree of decentralisation that the new constitution 
provides is indeed quite substantial. Power was devolved to 47 newly created and elected county 
governments with the executive power exercised by governors and legislative powers vested in 
the county assemblies. County administrations are also responsible for the delivery of key services, 
including health care services. The constitution also introduced a bi-cameral parliament with an 
                                              
7 Ibid.  
8 Poverty in Kenya was last measured in 2005 (Footnote 5).  
9 Footnote 5.  
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upper house (senate). Senators are directly elected by the counties and are supposed to protect 
the interests of county governments (Cheeseman et al. 2016). In terms of financing, county 
governments are supposed to receive not less than 15% of the national revenues. In addition, 
Central Government is required to set aside 0.5 percent of its revenues collected into an 
equalization fund to be used to provide basic services to marginalized areas in order to bring the 
level of these services (road, water, health facilities and electricity) to the level generally enjoyed 
by the rest of the population (Kempe 2015).  
Although initially central government strongly resisted such far-reaching decentralisation the Act 
has been fully implemented in 2013. While the constitution guarantees the counties to receive 
not less than 15 percent of national revenues, D’Arcy and Cornell (2016) in their account note 
that this threshold has been reached by far: In 2015, more than 32 percent of national revenue 
have actually been committed to the counties (D’Arcy and Cornell 2016).vi  
Devolution also meant a substantial re-shuffling of the local administrative apparatus. Up to 2015, 
the Provincial Authority was the core institution of local authority in Kenya. Designed as a 
prefectural authority in the local areas, its main task was to coordinate central government 
policies and development programmes. In addition, they arbitrated local conflicts (ranging from 
land to marriage disputes) and were in charge of local security (Hassan 2015).vii The traditional 
authorities, including Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs were formal members of this apparatus. Since 
independence, the Provincial Authority was used as the main arm of the executive power in Kenya 
in order to establish and exert presidential power in the most peripheral areas of Kenya. To this 
end, the provincial authorities were granted almost unlimited power, as long as they administered 
their sphere of influence to the satisfaction of the president in power (Oloo 2008).viii   
In order to break the centralised power of the provincial authority in the newly devolved system, 
also the provincial administrative system has experienced substantial changes getting completely 
separated from the national sphere. The county governors are also in charge of most government 
functions apart from police and national security, which remained in the hand of national 
government. The provincial authorities were entirely abolished, and replaced by the National 
Administration as the new national government administrative system. Headed by a County 
Commissioner, the structure exists side by side with the elected county government. In 
accordance with the devolved government structure, the Country Commissioner is supposed to 
report to county governor (See Table 2).  
However, despite the apparent success of devolution, observers note that this has not stopped the 
dominant political features of patronage and authoritarianism from working and exerting their 
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powers and influence by accommodating and skewing the new rules and regulations in their 
favour (Branch and Cheeseman 2010; Cheeseman et al. 2016). This also concerns decentral 
government structures, which despite decentralization remain a stronghold of national political 
influence at local level.ix  
 
The conditional cash transfer programme for orphans and vulnerable 
children (CT-OVC) 
Whereas social policies in Kenya were traditionally focused on classical welfare measures in the 
formal sector economy, including health insurance or pensions for old age and invalidity, non-
contributory schemes have increased substantially over the last decade in Kenya in order to 
combat rising poverty rates. There are currently more than 19 non-contributory programmes 
implemented across the country, including also the National Safety Net Programme (Inua Jamii) 
implemented by the Ministry of East-African Community, Labour and Social Protection and 
encompassing four major cash transfer programmes:  
 The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) aiming at reducing extreme hunger and 
vulnerability among the poorest households in four arid areas in North Kenya (covering 
100,000 households)  
 The Older People Cash Transfer (OPCT) targeting poor and vulnerable older persons 65 
and above (covering 203,011 households) 
 The Persons with Severe Disability Cash Transfer (PWSD-CT) targeting adults and children 
with severe disabilities (covering 45,505 households) 
 The Cash Transfer for Orphaned and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) targeting families 
living with OVCs (covering 365,000 households).10 
The CT-OVC is the oldest and largest of Kenya’s cash transfer programmes. Initiated in 2004 as a 
response to their rising number of orphans and vulnerable children due to HIV/AIDSx, it seeks to 
support families living with OVCs with regular cash transfers with the aim to encourage fostering 
and retention of such children within their families and communities and to promote their human 
capital development. More specifically, the programme aims at (1) increasing enrolment and 
retention rates of OVCs, (2) improving their health status through immunization, growth 
                                              
10 According to estimates, Kenya has 2,400,000 orphans and vulnerable children (Gender and Equality 
Commission 2014). 
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monitoring and vitamin supplements, (3) increasing civil registration of children and their 
caregivers, (4) supporting households through training measures to better take care of their 
health and nutrition and, (5) managing HIV/AIDS (Social Protection Secretariat 2017). The 
programme which is a national programme managed by the Ministry of EAC, Labour and Social 
Protection provides KES 2,000 per household per month paid on a bi-monthly basis through the 
Kenya Commercial Bank and Equity Bank. An impact evaluation from 2009 suggests that the 
transfer has substantially increased receiving households’  consumption levels, and made it easier 
to maintain their living standards while caring for OVCs. Significantly higher expenditures have 
been recorded for food, health, and clothing. Health expenses were particularly significant. The 
evaluation also shows that people spend the money on different types of food shifting to more 
nutritious and higher quality food and thus suggesting a positive impact on nutrition (The Kenya 
CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012).  
Despite being unconditioned, the cash transfer shows a positive impact on schooling, in particular 
at secondary level where school fees have to be paid and schools are fewer, thus implying higher 
travel costs. School attendance at secondary school level has increased by 9 percent as compared 
to the baseline. With regard to retention rates, it was shown that secondary-age children in 
intervention households are 0.096 fewer grades behind (about 7 per cent at the mean) and 5 per 
cent more likely to progress to the next grade between 2008 and 2009 compared to the 
baseline11 (Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012). The cash transfer also positively influenced 
dropout rates. The probability of returning to school among older children (age > 12 years) has 
increased by 2 percent (Ibid.) 
The day-to-day implementation and supervision of the CT-OVC lies with the CT-OVC Secretariat 
at the Department of Children’s Services at the Ministry of EAC, Labour and Social Policies. 
However, local administrative and political structures at the county and district level play an 
important role in programme implementation. These include the offices of the line ministry at the 
county and sub-county level (County and Sub-county Child officers) and new county government 
institutions that have been established in the context of devolved government and have been 
attributed a role with regard to the CT-OVC, in particular the CSACs (Constituency Social 
Assistance Committees). Furthermore, there are the CT-OVC institutions and mechanisms at 
                                              
11
 The indicator “grades behind” refers to the actual grade subtracted from ‘expected’ grade assuming on-time 
entry and no repetition. “Grade progression” refers to the fact whether or not the child moved up in grade 
between 2008 and 2009 (Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012).  
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communal level, including the LOC and the BWC. Table 2 gives a basic overview of the roles and 
responsibilities.  
 
Table 2: Administrative and Managing Structure CT-OVC 
National Level 
CT-OVC Secretariat in 
the Department of 
Children’s Services  
Coordinate targeting processes 
Produce the lists of eligible households and coordinate logistics 
for enrolment 
Request cash transfers for payment service providers and 
approve payments to beneficiary households  
Coordinate programme promotion procedures  
Organize training for programme operations for central and 
local staff  
Documentation and reporting  
County Level 
County Coordinator 
for Children’s 
Services (CCCS) 
Supervision 
Management of sub-county coordinators, Management of 
resources together with county  
Addressing and forwarding complaints and grievances; 
Reporting 
Sub-County Level 
Sub-County 
Children’s Officer 
(SCCO) 
Administration of CT-OVC at sub-county level 
Supports targeting, enrolment, payments, monitoring, case 
management and complaints 
Training of local committees on their tasks (BWC, LOC) 
Reporting 
Works closely with SCASC, LOCs, BWCs and other members of 
the community 
Area Advisory 
Council (AAC)xi 
Coordination and supervision all activities and services for 
children at the sub-county level (meets quarterly) 
Constituency Social 
Assistance 
Committees (CSAC) 
Supervision of targeting processes and implementation of all 
social protection measures at the constituency level (national 
body) 
Sub-County OVC 
Sub-Committee 
(SCOSC)  
Time bound to phases 
of programme 
expansion and 
targeting activities 
Supports the SCCOs with targeting process:  
Sensitisation of communities,  
Selection of enumerators to conduct targeting data collection;  
Validation of household lists;   
Supervision of the targeting process;  
Presentation of targeted households to AAC for approval 
Community Level 
Location 
Committeesxii (LOCs) 
Time bound 
Elected by community 
members (disbanded 
after enrolment) 
Awareness of the programme among community members 
Support programme targeting: 
List households with OVCs 
Mobilize potential beneficiaries for community validation and 
enrolment 
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Beneficiary Welfare 
Committees (BWCs) 
Elected by beneficiaries 
and must be a 
beneficiary of the CT-
OVC programme 
Disseminate information to beneficiaries (such as payment 
dates)  
Complaints and grievance system  
Compose lists of beneficiaries who did not receive a payment 
during a payment cycle to Sub-County Children’s Officers for 
follow-up 
Function of LOCs in locations where the programme is already 
operational but a scale-up is planned and a new targeting 
exercise needed 
Source: Department of Children’s Service 2013 
 
In 2014, the Constituency Social Assistance Committee (CSAC) has been introduced as a new 
supervisory body. It represents the Member of Parliament of the constituency level and is a parallel 
structure to the AAC representing the county government. The CSAC has a supervisory role with 
regard to all the social protection activities within an area. The committee consists of five 
representatives nominated by the Member of Parliament (MP) for the area, including two 
representatives of churches, two nominated by the Women’s Representatives and representatives 
of other line ministries having a stake in social protection at county level, such as Ministry of 
Education, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Devolution and Planning the National Administration 
represented by County Commissioner.  
In addition, local traditional authorities play an important role despite having no formal stake in 
the implementation of the programme. While these functions differ from one place to the other, 
as we will see further down, it is important to point out that in the Kenyan context traditional 
authorities are part of the formal government structure, thus ‘formal’ institutionalized structures. 
Their status as ‘informal’ or parallel institutions here refers to their role in the delivery of the CT-
OVC despite them having no formalized function in the process at all.  
 
Navigating the local political economy: The role of traditional authorities in 
implementing the CT-OVC  
Although the CT-OVC manual sets out a clear and detailed operational structure and 
accompanying rules and regulation for the programme, day-to-day implementation at local level 
differs quite substantially. Despite the fact that Chiefs, sub-chiefs and community elders do not 
have a formal function in the implementation of the CT-OVC, they are routinely at the centre 
stage of implementation processes playing a key role with regard to all major operational 
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functions (targeting, enrolment, monitoring, information, data collection, grievance and redress as 
well as disbursement). Whereas similar features can be observed across all three regions and 
counties, regional variations and differences exist.  
Transaction costs of programme implementation 
For the street-level bureaucrats in charge of implementing the programme and interacting with 
the communities on a day-to-day basis, such as the sub-county child officers, traditional 
authorities provide a key partner institution that substantially facilitates programme 
implementation and reduces transaction costs.  
Civil servants involved in the delivery of cash transfers and beneficiaries alike mention traditional 
authorities as playing an important complementary role with regard to targeting processes. This is 
especially important where communities are dispersed over great distances and in counties which 
in general are scarcely populated, such as West-Pokot. The fact that sub-chiefs representing these 
widely disbursed sub-communities are part of the LOC – despite this practice being against formal 
requirements and rules – guarantees that poor and vulnerable people who live at a great distance 
from the main community and who otherwise might be forgotten also have a chance to get 
enlisted and enrolled in the programme. As the LOC is usually constituted in the main community, 
LOC members tend to enlist people from the main location only because they are the ones they 
know. Here, the ‘unruly’ practice to include sub-chiefs into the LOC, allows Chiefs to acquire an 
important inclusionary function acting as a gap-filler for an effective but inadequate formal 
programme structure.   
Evidence from West-Pokot suggests the role of Chiefs as having an important substituting 
function with regard to targeting was even more pronounced in the beginning of the 
programme. The initially established and formally engrained targeting process foreseeing a 
geographic poverty targeting in order to determine the poorest areas of Kenya and concentrate 
the disbursement of funds there, had quickly been abandoned for a targeting being guided by a 
strong regionalism guaranteeing each region and county an equal share of CT-OVC beneficiaries. 
This together with the limited funds available meant that the national scale-up of the programme 
involved only a very limited number of beneficiaries per location. To the local civil servants it did 
not make sense to initiate a complex targeting process in order to identify just a few beneficiaries. 
In order to shorten the process and reduce transaction costs, they instead asked traditional 
authorities to identify eligible beneficiaries.  
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Traditional authorities play an important role with regard to the facilitation and organisation of 
community meetings, so-called “barazas” where information on the programme is disseminated 
and targeting, enrolment, pay-outs or sensitization campaigns take place. Without the 
involvement of the traditional authorities, it would be very challenging for a sub-county officer to 
organise these community meetings. In all the interviews, local civil servants involved in the 
delivery of the programme emphasized this aspect over and over again. Although civil servants are 
aware about the ambivalent role of traditional authorities with regard to programme 
implementation, as the quotation below vividly shows, it appears impossible for civil-servants to 
by-pass them or enforce formal regulations preventing traditional authorities to be part of the 
LOC or the BWC. Civil servants simply depend on them in order to do their job.   
 
“The chiefs are supposed to be eliminated at the LOCs level. But now we have a 
problem, (…), you cannot do away with chiefs. One, depending on the challenges we 
face, this area is so expansive. These are the people who assist us, - together with BWC - 
to mobilise. These are the people who are most trusted by the public here. You cannot 
do anything without the chief. You say you do away with them, you are doomed. When 
the chief says something, it is like law, you see things moving. When the chief informs 
people that payment starts tomorrow, by tomorrow morning you see 500 people at the 
banks….” (Int. 166: Local civil servant) 
 
Gate-keepers for social protection  
Despite having an apparently positive complementary and sometimes substituting role in reducing 
transaction costs and facilitating programme implementation, the strong involvement of 
traditional authorities clearly comes at a cost. Although the manual advises to the contrary 
(Department of Children’s Services 2013), in many locations, sub-chiefs and community elders 
form part of the LOC. Even where they are not part of the committee, they still have a decisive 
role in key programme operations, such as targeting by “advising” programme structures.  
 
“You know targeting we only pinpoint after creating awareness we select groups of 
people called locational OVC committees who go to the ground to enlist the families 
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who they think are eligible for the program in collaboration with local leaders like I’ve 
said, like wazee wa mitaa (village elders) and all those.” (Sub-County Child Officer) 
 
This “advisory” function is perceived as being highly ambivalent though, as traditional authorities 
exert a considerable influence as to who may be included into the programme or excluded from 
it. Many stakeholders, including the local civil servants in charge of implementing the programme 
(County Child Officer, Sub-County Child Officers, representatives of the CSAC) and in particular, 
community members complain about Chiefs, sub-chiefs and community elders skewing targeting 
mechanisms in their favour enlisting own family members or kinsmen. It is considered open 
knowledge that chiefs enlist people whom they own a favour or in return for a share of the 
transfer every-time it comes. This would confirm the highly competitive relationship between 
traditional authorities and formalised targeting processes as widely described in the literature 
where informal rules and regulation of clientilism, ethnicity and kinship are crowding out formal 
rules and regulations, usually with negative exclusionary consequences for the poor and 
vulnerable whom access to the programme is denied (see for example Pellissery 2005; Casson et 
al. 2010; Crost and Kamphampati 2010; Marcesse 2018).  
The powerful gatekeeping function of traditional authorities is even more pronounced with 
regard to their formal administrative role in the National Administration: As part of the national 
administrative system, Chiefs are in charge of issuing ID-cards at local level. Holding an ID-
document is a core precondition in order to get enrolled in the programme and access the CT-
OVC money in the bank. In the areas close to the border, where ethnic groups lead a life in which 
migration across national borders make up an integral part of their livelihoods, we found evidence 
that chiefs deny actual beneficiaries their ID because of their migration background defining them 
as non-Kenyans and thus, not eligible to the programme benefits. This led to severe conflicts with 
the formal programme management represented by the Sub-County Child Officer. 
Conflict settlement  
Another important programme dimension where ‘formal’ programme structures and ‘informal’ 
local political and social structures collide is the grievance and redress mechanisms for CT-OVC. 
With regard to complaints mechanisms, the CT-OVC foresees that it is the beneficiary welfare 
committees representing the beneficiaries as the major mechanism through which complaints are 
to be channelled up the programme structure. However, we have found across all locations that it 
is actually the Chief to whom beneficiaries mostly turn to when they have complaints. The 
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historical dispute settlement function of the Chief, which is institutionalised in the context of the 
national administrative structure, renders him a trusted and highly experienced and accepted 
dispute settlement institution compared to the recently established BWCs. This is especially the 
case there where BWCs do not work or are inactive. However, we have found that it is also 
common practice where the BWC is very active and respected by the beneficiaries. In contrast to 
their role in targeting processes, which by beneficiaries and local civil servants alike is perceived 
highly ambivalent, their role in managing grievance and redress in the CT-OVC remains 
unchallenged by the various stakeholders. On the contrary, they are perceived as being more 
efficient and effective than ‘formal’ programme structures in managing complaints. This may also 
explain the fact why traditional authorities play an important role in selecting the BWC, which 
according to the manual is supposed to be elected by beneficiaries only and - being the 
representative body of beneficiaries – is supposed to encompass beneficiaries only in order to 
guarantee accountability and transparency. Instead, it is common practice that community elders 
or respected community members such as teachers or successful businessmen are often charged 
with managing the BWC. They usually also have the capacity to engage in the BWCs work which 
- apart from dispute settlement - also includes information dissemination and monitoring. Rather 
than being two parallel sets of institutions that complement each other, here both ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ institutions appear to collide into one re-interpreting the “rules of the game” according 
to local efficiency and effectiveness criteria but guaranteeing their basic function.  
Putting the pieces together: Multiple roles for traditional authorities  
Traditional authorities thus represent highly effective and efficient agencies in delivering social 
policies that complement and partly also substitute formal institutions. Their social and political 
authority in some matters renders them more efficient and effective than formal programme 
structures, also in the eyes of the local civil servants. Despite the fact that most of them have a 
critical stance towards traditional authorities and complain about their corrupt behaviour, civil 
servants continue to involve them in order to reduce transaction costs and render programmes 
more efficient and effective. This extends also to other operational aspects that would require a 
lot of time and human resources, such as the collection of beneficiaries’ telephone numbers in 
order to expand and update the database.  
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Table 3: Traditional authorities and their informal institutional role in the CT-OVC 
 
Source: Author based on Helmke and Levitsky 2004 
 
The degree to which the Chiefs and traditional authorities can exercise their function as gate-
keepers and influence social protection implementation processes thus appears to be directly 
related to the human and technical resources and capacities of local civil servants that enable 
them to compete with local traditional authorities in mediating access to public services. Where 
they face major geographic, technical and financial constraints, they heavily depend on traditional 
authorities as partners in order to implement social protection programmes effectively and 
efficiently. This appears to be more the case in rural areas where administrative units cover much 
bigger and often scarcely populated areas and where transaction costs to get people informed, 
enrolled and cash transfers delivered are much higher. Many SCCOS complained about their 
heavy workload of which the CT-OVC is just one among many other child-related projects they 
are supposed to administer. In addition, communication is a major challenge in rural areas, as 
mobile devices often do not work. Many do not have a vehicle or the fuel to cover the distances 
necessary to carry out their work. Finally, as we have seen, civil servants depend on the social and 
political authority of the traditional authorities in order to involve the community as required by 
the CT-OVC.  
In town, the situation is slightly different. Whereas transaction costs are lower in urban areas, 
which are usually densely populated and where beneficiaries are easier to reach living spatially 
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closer to the civil service and the state, also social cohesion is less. Chiefs still play a role in urban 
areas, their authority is however much more disputed and often in competition with other 
patrons, in particular political parties.  
 
Navigating the local political economy: Additional factors influencing the 
role of traditional authorities in implementing the CT-OVC  
The previous paragraph has discussed multidimensional roles of traditional authorities in 
implementing the CT-OVC. Here, the role of contextual factors influencing the position of 
traditional authorities within the CT-OVC in general will be discussed. In particular, this section 
addresses the role of devolution, the specific local context and time.    
Devolution  
Institutional equilibria established between or across formal and informal institutions are not static 
nor the same everywhere. Rather, they are fragile constellations being in a constant process of 
adaptation to new programme requirements or changes in the overall social, economic or political 
context. The devolution process that has been ongoing in Kenya since 2010 has substantially 
influenced the institutional development of the CT-OVC programme at local level. Contrary to the 
general arguments of devolution bringing social services closer to the poor (for example, Rees and 
Hossain 2010), it appears to have shifted the institutional equilibrium towards traditional 
authorities again, allowing the latter to increase their influence. Despite the CT-OVC being a 
national programme where local government levels formally have no influence at all with regard 
to its management and delivery, this did not prevent the programme and social protection policies 
in general to become more and more politicized at local level. Politicians at local level and the MPs 
at national level increasingly realize the political mileage that they can gain from the programme. 
As a result, they increase pressure on the local government institutions and traditional authorities 
to target potential voters skewing targeting processes even more.  
Local context  
The described dynamics are however not the same everywhere. Local context influences the 
degree to which ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions are interwoven in order to deliver the cash 
transfer programme. In town, where traditional authorities historically are less influential as 
compared to rural areas, these dynamics appear to play out more in favour of the ‘formal’ CT-
OVC structures. This does however, not necessarily imply that competing forms of cooperation do 
22 
 
not exist, meaning that there is less corruption or less exclusion errors. Often it is simply the 
patrons that change from traditional authorities to political parties. Nonetheless, our research 
seems to suggest that in town, where local power relations are more based on party politics and 
political competition for votes are high, there are also more checks and balances in place.  
Time 
Shifts in the institutional set-up towards the ‘formal’ rules of the game appear to depend on what 
commonly is referred to as “institutional learning”. Where the CT-OVC is already in place for 
longer, ‘formal’ institutional rules and regulations appear to be more ingrained and commonly 
accepted. Usually people have a fairly good knowledge about the programme and its main 
operational features, including targeting, enrolment and complaints mechanisms. This appears to 
be “taming” to a certain extent the negative influence of the ‘informal’ institutions. However, as 
we have mentioned above, this is not automatic or irreversible. Devolution appears to reshuffle 
again the newly established equilibrium, partly “undoing” institutional learning processes.    
  
Discussion  
The analysis of the political economy of implementation processes of the CT-OVC in Kenya at the 
local level shows that the formal administrative set-up of social policy interventions as described in 
the operational manual represent just one dimension of ‘the rules of the game’. ‘Informal’ or 
‘parallel’ institutions are equally important in making social policy work in Kenya, confirming the 
overall importance of these sets of institutions in determining policy outcomes (Wanyama and 
McCord 2017; Lavers and Hickey 2016 or Hyden 2008).  
Much of the debate on design and development of social services discusses ‘informal’ institutions 
as having a largely negative impact on desired policy outcomes, i.e. reducing their pro-poor 
effects by limiting access for the poor or by slowing down implementation processes which 
influence needs to be avoided as much as possible (for example Calder et al. 2011). We have seen 
that the tendency of treating formal and informal institutions as two separate sets of institutions 
with informal institutions being considered as inferior because less efficient and effective than 
formal institutions does not allow to capture the dynamic realities on the ground. Rather than 
focusing on one or the other, evidence shows that implementation processes get enmeshed in a 
dynamic interplay between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions meditating access to resources. This 
hybrid institutional set-up does not only produce negative outcomes, but plays also an important 
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role in making social services accessible for the poor and thus has positive effects with regard to 
intended programme objectives. This is in particular the case in constrained administrative settings 
where street-level bureaucrats need to come to terms with the lack of human and financial 
resources, technological challenges, challenging geographic settings and slow bureaucratic 
practices. In this situation, informal structures play an important complementary role as gap filler.  
The analysis shows that the informal institutions may also substitute formal ones where the latter 
are based on false assumptions or a simply “too young” to be able to compete with engrained 
institutional structures that are much more efficient and effective. In our analysis, we have seen 
that their substitutive functions mainly relate to the operational features of the CT-OVC based on 
so-called community-based local implementation mechanisms, such as the BWC or the LOC. The 
assumption behind this is that these mechanisms formed by local people and rooted locally have a 
better knowledge and understanding of local poverty and know where eligible people can be 
found, an important pre-condition for targeting. Also, community-based organisations are 
perceived to ensure more participation on part of the poor people, more inclusion and more 
transparency.  
However, just because institutions are community-based, this does not mean that they are more 
transparent, equitable and just. Rather, evidence suggests that this depends on their capacities, in 
particular knowledge on programme structures and targeting criteria (training and information) 
and secondly, on their time to engage in such processes. Both are generally scarce resources in 
poor beneficiaries. In such a situation, two things happen: Institutions collide, meaning that 
influential community members, including traditional authorities, take over the representative 
body of beneficiaries in order to guarantee effective representation or beneficiaries fall back on 
other, already pre-existing institutions that they consider more effective and efficient and which 
they trust more. The important role of the Chief as a substituting dispute settlement mechanism 
for CT-OVC is a case in point.    
The strong role of informal institutions in implementing the programme may also distort 
implementation processes leading to divergent outcomes with particularly negative consequences 
for the poor. However, the degree to which formal rules or changes in formal rules may act as a 
catalyst for informal institutional change depends very much on the overall power balance and 
the relative strength of both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions. This differs depending very much 
on the local political setting and on time, i.e. for how long a programme has already been in 
place. 
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It seems that in an urban setting where social cohesion is less, also the role of traditional 
authorities as an important parallel institution is reduced as compared to rural areas, where 
traditional authorities are very powerful and cannot be ignored. In addition, rural areas also face 
much more logistical and administrative constraints than urban areas. Street-level bureaucrats 
responsible for implementing the CT-OVC across vast geographic areas with a widely dispersed 
population and little available resources and logistical support tend to be in greater need of them 
to get their work done. A trade-off thus takes place where divergent behaviour is tolerated for 
the sake of enabling an efficient and effective implementation. In fact, we have found less 
evidence concerning complaints about traditional authorities influencing targeting practices in 
urban areas, even if this does not mean that other parallel institutions, such as political parties 
may play an important informal role as gatekeepers for the CT-OVC. 
The institutional equilibrium established in-between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions in 
implementing CT-OVC at local level is not stable, but highly fragile and may shift over time. An 
important factor herein seems to be institutional learning processes (Watts et al. 2003). Where 
the CT-OVC already exists for longer, a greater awareness and understanding both on the 
recipient and implementation side exist with positive impact on the acceptance of formal rules 
and regulations and adherence to them. This shift does however not necessarily move in a linear 
way from the ‘informal’ to the ‘formal’. As we have seen, powerful external shocks, such as the 
recent devolution may substantially reshuffle the local rules of implementation. At least from our 
data it appears that increasing politicization of the CT-OVC programme in Kenya in the process of 
devolution has strengthened the influence of traditional authorities as competing institutions in 
the implementation process, partly undoing the institutional learning that has been taking place. 
The back and forth movements between convergent and divergent outcomes may take place 
simultaneously within the same institution. From a policy perspective, this suggests that there is 
need for a more differentiated appraisal of ‘informal’ institutions and their role in implementing 
social policies in Kenya and elsewhere. Rather than focusing on trying to limit their influence 
when designing operational programme structures, empirical evidence suggests that they simply 
cannot be ignored as important stakeholders in the day-to-day implementation process. There is 
need to better look on how ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions can possibly be integrated and 
aligned in order to produce convergent, pro-poor policy outcomes rather than ignoring them as 
dysfunctional from the outset giving leeway to diverging goals that commonly run counter to the 
interests and needs of the most marginalized. This would also imply a re-consideration of qualities 
ascribed to these institutional settings. While efficiency and effectiveness are the buzzwords when 
it comes to discussing governance in weak administrative settings, we have shown that this is not 
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necessarily confined to ‘formal’ structures only. ‘Informal’ institutions may in this respect be much 
more efficient and effective in delivering social policies than formal ones and even more so, when 
they cooperate and join forces.  
  
Conclusion 
In this article on the politics of implementation in Kenya’s largest cash transfer programme CT-
OVC, we have shown that despite not having a formal function in the implementation of the 
programme, Chiefs, sub-chiefs and community elders are routinely at the centre stage of 
implementation processes playing a key role with regard to all major operational functions 
(targeting, enrolment, monitoring, grievance and redress as well as disbursement). This does not 
always produce negative outcomes for the poor in terms of gaining access to pro-poor policies 
competing with formal institutional settings. On the contrary, we have shown that ‘informal’ 
institutions may have an important complementary and substitutive function in implementing 
social policies providing an important gap filler function for formal implementation structures.  
Rather than viewing them as dysfunctional to effective and efficient programme implementation, 
the article has argued for the need to re-consider formal and informal institutions as part of the 
same institutional setting in which programmes are implemented and access to resources and 
their distribution are negotiated. Such a broader-based view on institutional change that 
emphasizes the interplay between formal and informal institutions as the institutional normality 
may also allow for broader perspective on how implementation challenges are being tackled 
which hitherto mainly concentrates on optimizing operational aspects of a programme structure 
without looking too much at the social, political, geographic, economic and administrative 
context in which it is embedded.  
While the article has identified differences across geographic, social and demographic settings 
within Kenya in how formal and informal institutions interact and social policy programmes are 
implemented, there is need for further research to gain more in-depth knowledge on how context 
actually influences the implementation and delivery of national programmes that in principle are 
based on a homogeneous implementation structure.  
The article has also shown that the interplay between formal and informal institutions is in a 
constant process of re-shuffling trying to establish new equilibria across formal and informal 
structures and logics. This does not necessarily always drift towards more formalised rules and 
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regulations. However, more research is needed to shed light on the nature of formal/informal 
institutional interaction across time and see whether there are commonalities across countries and 
programmes with regard to what is generally called ‘institutional learning’ and at the same time, 
factors that may reverse this process, as it seems to be the case with devolution in Kenya.   
From a policy point of view, there is need for process evaluations of social policy programmes to 
dedicate much more time and thinking to the politics of implementation and on how the local 
institutional environment meaning both formal and informal mechanisms can be strengthened in 
order to increase pro-poor outcomes.  
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